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Abstract
In recent years, a collaborative approach to solving socio-urban problems has become common. In some cases, organizational 
changes have been worked out in enterprises and governments to accommodate the collaborative process, and people start-
ed recognizing the already present collaborative aspect of the creative process. Nevertheless, a rigorous theoretical/conceptual 
background that can sustain continuous social innovation based on accountable experimentation is still majorly lacking in these 
contexts. The specific approach elaborated for Metadesign by the author can provide a bridge between these innovative inten-
tions and a new epistemological framework that has emerged from contemporary philosophy, anthropology, and complexity 
theory. In the context of the so-called “Smart City”, Metadesign could serve as an accessible approach to the democratic organiza-
tion of communities so they can perform qualified and consequential creative work, including rethinking their own role in urban 
planning (meta-action). This approach is based on a new social interaction repertoire, partially derived from the popularization 
of digital interaction, but also from a new epistemic: complexity theory involves extreme shifts in the prevailing epistemological 
outlook, requiring new cognitive tools to cope with the increasing cognitive load in social interaction needed in collaborative 
creative work. This new epistemic also involves changing the way we frame objects of knowledge, recognizing new “objects of 
design”, of particular interest to the Metadesign action, that can mediate social change in a concerted and conscious manner.
Keywords: metadesign, urban planning, social change, innovation, micro-politics, smart cities.
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Introduction
Paul Virilio (1995) has used the term “Metadesign” to 
allude to the widespread reality of social contexts con-
ceived by a minority by way of concentration of political 
power, and not created by citizens in a concerted man-
ner – i.e. “Metadesign” as the contradictory but recurrent 
socio-political action constructed as the illegitimate or-
ganization of the social regulatory meta-structure that 
we call “legislation”. I do not think that this very common 
situation has been planned to be like this – it has emerged 
from a very limited social interaction repertoire, which is 
characterized by a barrier between two very different so-
cial scales: the community and the State. My proposal is 
to bridge these two scales by way of a set of social games 
developed through Metadesign. In this sense, “Metade-
sign” is not necessarily an illegitimate process, but in fact 
an inevitable stance towards social complexity, allowing 
a large number of people to interact in a concerted and 
meaningful way. What these social games can do is to si-
multaneously activate two very different cognitive modes: 
“savage thinking” (Levi-Strauss, 1989 [1962]; Clastres, 2003; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Viveiros de Castro, 2015) and 
“instrumental thinking” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969).
I have re-interpreted Metadesign to make it work in 
a very wide array of techno-social contexts (Vassão, 2010). 
Metadesign can aid people, communities and organiza-
tions in creating new social diagrammatics (ecosystems) 
and/or adjusting existing ones. Through this re-interpre-
tation, Metadesign is a set of four cognitive tools: (a) dia-
gram; (b) abstraction; (c) emergence; (d) procedure. These 
are, in themselves, open sub-sets of different tools and 
methods, and they interrelate in multiple and intricate 
ways. Their usage constitutes a non-specialized approach 
to design, applicable to any context. Rigorously, Metade-
sign is an umbrella concept that encompasses any and 
every design action and/or method – not because it has 
foreseen or could foresee all of these, but because the 
four mentioned cognitive tools are, in fact, four different 
aspects of the human cognitive abilities when applied to 
consequential activities, i.e. trying to do something in the 
world – so any design tool, method or concept could be 
seen as a specific articulation of those four, which have 
been identified from three fronts: practical field work, bib-
liographical survey on design methods and philosophical 
inquiry on the poietic process. In this paper, I will briefly 
present the four cognitive tools and summarize their pos-
sible application contexts, paying special attention to mi-
cro-political action in urban contexts.
Diagram
Since its inception as a field in mathematics, in the 
beginning of the 1800s, topology has come to change 
not only mathematics, but also all other sciences, and has 
had influence on many diverse fields such as psychology, 
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engineering, architecture, and electronics. Piaget has con-
sidered it the basic cognitive competence of the human 
mind, indicating “schemes” as a inescapable cognitive en-
tity (Piaget et al., 1969). Topology is so fundamental to the 
human cognitive processes that we learn how to naively 
articulate it in our childhoods and later dismiss it as “too 
simple”, all the while missing or misusing it to understand 
the world around us. The most direct and accessible way to 
make topology tangible is through diagrams, which can be 
very simple or extremely complex. A very important aspect 
of diagrams is that they do not limit themselves to repre-
senting reality: they actually articulate new realities through 
their own constitution. From Deligny (2015), through Lévi-
Strauss (1989 [1962]), Piaget (in Piaget et al., 1969) and 
Deleuze (1988), the diagram has come to be understood as 
a way to present, or “apresent”1, realities: meaning to intro-
duce, to posit, to poietize, to exercice poetics.
Of course, diagrams can represent realities – i.e. to 
make the absent present. But its importance in Metade-
sign lies in its ability to create, in a pre-linguistic manner, 
very complex, intricate and operative entities – a diagram 
makes present a reality, in the same way that an electronic 
circuit does not represent but is the flux of electrons; also 
a fluvial system does not represent but is the flux of water.
When we face a situation so complex that a verbal 
or written description fails, we resort to diagrams. Since 
the dawn of ecology, ecologists have been studying and 
understanding ecosystems through diagrams. The Apollo 
(NASA moon landings) and Polaris (US Navy nuclear mis-
siles) programs – both extremely and notoriously complex 
projects – have developed CPM and PERT methods, both 
heavily dependent on diagrams to activate (and not simply 
represent) social productive circuits – through Gantt charts, 
critical path diagrams, sequence analysis, etc. Cybernetics 
employs a heavy use of diagrams to design, represent and 
build systems. Deleuze (1988) suggests that to better un-
derstand Foucault’s assertions about the panoptic, it must 
be seen as a diagram that can be “apresented” in architec-
tural form, or otherwise in the bureaucratic complex that 
constitutes the industrial world’s disciplinary system.
Through topology, and its applications in any field of 
knowledge and action, we can recognize recurrent pat-
terns in a very efficient manner: isomorphy (“same form”) 
of different systems can be easily detected through their 
presentation in diagrammatic form. In fact, Baran (1964) 
has been able to classify, through the use of diagrams, all 
telecommunication networks in three types: centralized, 
decentralized and distributed networks – having direct 
consequences to the emergence of the Internet as we 
know it; Deleuze and Guattari (1995 [1987]) have charac-
terized two dichotomic cognitive, social, economic, politi-
cal, linguistic and aesthetical modes: the Tree and the Rhi-
zome, two different diagrammatical configurations that 
pertain two conflicting approaches to whatever aspects 
one might consider in the world – incurring in identifying 
two social-political-aesthetical stances: the sedentary (civ-
ilized), statutory, centralized Tree; and the nomad (savage), 
communitarian, and distributed Rhizome.
To design making use of diagrams and topology 
opens up the human mind to new levels of complexity, 
making it reach to meta-contexts, and understanding the 
inherent limitations of specific social-political configura-
tions – being that in the urban space or in the meta-space 
of social politics. Especially, it is very useful to utilize dia-
grammatics to describe and articulate social gatherings 
and organizations, being them short- or long-term, and 
small- or large-scale structures.
To such context, there is a “topological typology” 
that I have developed based on both Deleuze/Guattari’s 
Tree-Rhizome dichotomy and Baran’s tree types of net-
works. Such scheme is very elucidating regarding so-
cio-political structures, and it is based on a pragmatic 
take on the cybernetics/ecology concept of the “relational 
space” (Ek, 2006): the position of a entity in a network (or 
diagram) indicates the tensions that repose upon it – even 
if the occupant of that relative position in the system is 
replaced, the tensions will remain relatively unchanged, 
so does the behavior of the entity. So, if there is a desire 
or need to change what is being, or not, accomplished 
by a group, community or organization, there must be a 
change in its organizational structure: different people 
must occupy different positions, linked by different con-
nections – the relational space must change.
Generally speaking, there would be only five basic to-
pological types – this is obviously a gross reduction of the 
inherent complexity of the social world; but, nevertheless, 
Figure 1. Topological typology.
Centralized
C: H = 0
(i)
Decentralized
DC: H < N
Distributed
DT: H   N
Saturated
S: H > N
Ring
R: H = 1
(ii) (iii)
1 I take a risk on using an Anglicization of the Portuguese word “apresentar”, meaning: to produce, to present, to make apparent.
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it is extremely useful do recognize recurrent patterns, and 
the outcomes that they entice. It is also important to have 
in mind that these types can indicate different aspects, re-
gions or levels of a more complex and thus less reducible 
system. The five types are (Figure 1): (a) centralized systems, 
(b) decentralized systems, (c) distributed systems, (d) sat-
urated systems, (e) ring systems. The first two (i) comprise 
trees, hierarchies, cladograms – systems that have a clearly 
defined central entity, but may or may not branch out into 
regional centralities (branches, klados); the second two (ii) 
are variations on the rhizome, being that the distributed 
systems local connectivity, or the physically improbable 
saturatedly connected systems (every node is connected 
with all other nodes), and both comprise open organiza-
tions; and the last one (iii) the ring is a single-holed en-
tity, like all vertebrate animals (digestive tube), but also 
all social gathering dealing with an specific matter: there 
is the need to fill this hole with meaningful things (food, 
affection, ideas, purposes, expectations, etc.). Through 
this topological typology we can identify which type of 
connectivity we’re dealing with, or trying to create: if an 
organization wants to be more “innovative” – i.e., open to 
new ideas – the first (i) type of system is a very inadequate 
configuration; but otherwise, if an organization wants to 
have a very clearly defined command and control circuit, 
it should go exactly for the first (i) type, allowing hierar-
chical governance, excluding divergent behavior. But the 
metadesigner must be aware that these types indicate as-
pects of the reality being mapped, and cannot contain or 
summarize the concrete complexity inherent to any living 
ecosystem (being that an organization, a city, the human 
body, the environment), and he or she must be available 
to compose different types regarding different aspects, 
and connect them in a “meta-diagram”. Interestingly, this 
meta-diagram can be, in itself, a version of any of these 
five basic types.
Abstraction
The Greek word “logos” refers to an array of mean-
ings: to analyze or to synthesize (to separate and to join), 
to communicate (through words), “word”, to talk, to under-
stand. Aristotle postulated “logics” as the formal articula-
tion of language – but it was only two and a half millennia 
later that Boole posited binary algebra as a completely 
artificial formal language, the current underlying ground 
on which stands information technology. Abstraction is 
the separation or joining that happens through the use 
of language: we encapsulate groups of entities that com-
pose a system to reduce its complexity, maintaining the 
cognitive load below our minds’ limitations – by aggre-
gating blocks of things an naming these blocks. This is, of 
course, a meta-reduction: the reductive description of the 
reductive process. But, for the purposes of this paper, it is 
enough to understand that abstraction is the process of 
composition and decomposition of systems, assembling 
(compounding) and disassembling sets of objects, having 
(written or spoken) language as an ever-present labeling 
and abstracting activity.
Cybernetics and Complexity Theory present any 
system as composed by “levels of abstraction”. This is the 
formal ability to understand the successive layers that 
compose reality: through coupling, encapsulation and 
modularization, we are able to articulate layers of com-
plexity in very large systems. In biology, for instance, 
we can regard the lowest level of abstraction – chemi-
cal bonds between atoms – as the basis for what can be 
constructed by these basic modules – organic molecules 
–, constituting a specific level of abstraction, studied by 
molecular biologists. On top of molecules, sits another lev-
el of abstraction: cell organelles, which are composed of 
molecules. On top of organelles, sits cells, which compose 
tissue, that are the basis on which organs form, that are 
the constituents of bodily systems, which compose bod-
ies, that compound into communities, which compose so-
cieties, that are the basis of ecosystems – from the atom to 
the planet, in ten steps, or “levels of abstraction”.
The same approach can be applied to artificial sys-
tems, such as industrial products or computers: specific 
modules are grouped in operating modules, that compose 
further operating modules, compounding levels or layers 
of complexity or abstraction.
For the sake of a summarized presentation of Meta-
design, these levels of abstraction can produce two kinds 
of entities: taxonomies or models. Taxos means “class”, 
and taxonomies organize entities into classes, allowing 
Figure 2. Taxonomy and model. Here we use diagrams do illustrate two different aspects of abstraction. (a) The typical 
taxonomic tree, used in biology, library science, information architecture, etc. And (b) a generic example of a model, 
composed of entities that are encapsulated on modules, which are encapsulated in larger meta-modules, and so forth, 
until we have an “object”, like an automobile, for instance.
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the inventory of complex systems. To some degree, the 
person or community interested in organizing a “domain” 
arbitrarily defines taxonomies about it, be that the polit-
ical system of a country, the available auto parts in a car 
factory, or the world’s living species. The word “model” 
shares the same etymology as “module”, meaning “to mea-
sure” – it is the description of the different sub-systems of 
a meta-system, the working components of an operating 
unit, or the simple parts that compose a product or object. 
Through modularization, a highly complex object, com-
posed of myriad parts, can be assembled in a concerted 
manner, entailing many levels of abstraction.
One crucial aspect of abstraction, and of the use of 
language to articulate complexity, is a system’s level of for-
malization: in everyday colloquial speech, people commu-
nicate in a very low level of formalization; differently, a com-
puter processes strictly formal signs in an artificial language 
free of ambiguity. The higher the level of formalization, the 
lower the meaning of what’s being conveyed: informal, or 
para-formal communication convey lots of meaning, in a 
very ambiguous manner; while the strictly formal Boolean 
algebra means literally nothing – only through human in-
terpretation does a computer communicate anything. The 
level of formalization is also an important part of the com-
munication systems utilized by communities (low level) 
and statutory systems (high level). Both can produce differ-
ent consequences and both are important in constituting a 
new form of social-political integration.
A final aspect of abstraction that is useful here is the 
relation between “patterns” and “standards”: patterns are 
para-formal aggregates, not necessarily organized in a 
perfectly defined module, they are accessible to non-spe-
cialized personnel, and promote creative interaction; while 
standards regulate the exact composition of an entity, 
from the viewpoint of large-scale organizations, allowing 
interoperability, components replacement, homologation 
and complex industrial product architectures. Alexander 
pioneered the “Design Patterns” movement, trying to set 
up a community-based urban planning approach, utilizing 
approximate patterns as the basis for the configuration of 
architectural and urban projects (1979). Later a group of 
programmers bridged that intent into the computer and 
information technology arena, making design patterns a 
common way to organize large-scale projects (Beck and 
Cunningham, 1987). One interesting situation in which ab-
straction, patterns, standards, and formalization all come 
into play is the way Free Software programmers interact 
with each other during the creative process: many differ-
ent levels of formalization are used in different moments 
of the development of software – from the low-formality, 
high-meaning, interaction in initial phases, to the high-for-
mality, low-meaning (measured by the level of creative ac-
tion and accessibility) interaction and documentation in 
later stages.
The communication games people play in society, 
in organizations, enterprises and communities all entice 
different levels or formalization, articulating different 
subjects that are, in fact, our attention directed to differ-
ent levels of abstraction. Metadesigners should be able 
to direct, interfere and manipulate these communication 
games, taking part in them and also proposing changes 
and new games (see the section “Procedure”).
Emergence
In 1948, Weaver posited that science was lacking ad-
equate methods to understand and to act upon what he 
called “organized complex systems” – such as living sys-
tems, cities, the economy, and populations –, and suggest-
ed that new epistemological approaches were needed to 
deal with them, probably requiring computational meth-
ods. Not long after Weaver’s suggestion, Jacobs (1961) 
utilized his idea about “organized complex systems” to 
characterize healthy urban communities as self-organized, 
from the ground up, in a grassroots or bottom-up fashion. 
What Jacobs noticed was that urban communities had the 
inherent ability to organize themselves in a meaningful 
and complex manner, and that over-controlling central-
ized planning schemes (common at the time, and still the 
norm today) make it difficult for this self-organization pro-
cess to happen.
Hardt and Negri (2009) utilize Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s assertions about turbulent systems, the singularity 
of persons and the creative process, and the necessity to 
understand the multiplicity in which this singularity in-
curs (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995 [1987]), to develop their 
critical concept of the Multitude, denying that it can be 
reduced to the “people”, or “the masses”, or “population”. 
Hardt and Negri affirm, in a different but related fashion to 
Weaver, that probability and statistics can’t deal adequate-
ly with the complexities of social life’s concreteness: we’ve 
been overly dependent on very limited constructs derived 
from a statistical epistemology – what Weaver refers to as 
“disorganized complex systems” –, such as “population”, 
“target audience”, “means”, “modes” and “medians” – which 
have reinforced ancient beliefs about “universal types”, 
now considered knowledge products validated via data 
gathering and processing.
During the past sixty years or so, a new epistemolog-
ical approach has been amassing into what is currently 
called “Complexity Theory”. Chaos Theory, Fractals and 
Artificial Life, are all scientific lines of inquiry that led 
to new understanding of the inherent complexity and 
self-organizing abilities of living and non-living systems. 
The main aspect of the systems studied in these fields 
is their ability to self-organize in an emergent fashion: 
micro-interactions, in the smallest scales, lead to incred-
ibly complex macro-aspects of the system. One instance 
is the vastly complex and coherent behavior of animal 
societies, such as anthills, beehives, bands of birds and 
schools of fish: relatively simple behavior traits observed 
in micro-interactions between individuals or small 
groups of individuals can compose themselves into in-
creasingly complex behaviors as we increase the scale in 
which we regard that society.
As Mcluhan said, “we look at the present through a 
rear-view mirror [of a car]” (Mcluhan et al., 1967, p. 74-75): 
we can see the world in its complex interactive dynamics 
only after it has been realized, or actualized. By looking 
into micro-macro interactions we can see why there were 
so many ecological disasters in the past – from the Neolith-
ic depletion of the European forest system, to the 1930s 
Dust Bowl phenomenon – the amassing of complexity was 
so poorly understood that when a small change in the be-
havior of self-replicating entities (ourselves) had a tremen-
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dous impact in the larger layout of the ecosystem, we were 
not able to cope with its disastrous effects.
So we need to think in ecosystemical ways: experi-
mentation in small contexts is crucial, so we can err more 
often, without worrying so much about large-scale out-
comes. Not only to avoid ecological catastrophes, but also 
to allow society to self-organize in more sophisticated, 
complex, and subtler ways than we can envision or antic-
ipate, when we try to design macro-contexts without tak-
ing micro-interactions into account.
So also, we need to be aware that the emergent prin-
ciple indicates that, through self-organization, changes in 
quantity incur in changes in quality: larger systems are not 
just bigger, they are different – they change and reconfig-
ure themselves as they grow, creating new socio-politi-
cal realities. Examples abound in history. To mention just 
three: (1) The printing press became the basis of modern 
nation-states (The “Gutenberg galaxy” mentioned by Mc-
luhan, 1962); (2) The personal automobile engendered 
city suburbs, urban sprawl and the current geo-politi-
cal energy crisis; (3) The Internet is inducing new modes 
in politics, rapid and “chaotic” socio-economic growth, 
and the demise of long-standing revenue models. These 
large-scale consequences – in space, time and society – 
emerged from relatively humble beginnings: none of the 
initial proponents of these three instances were aware of 
the eventual effect their inventions were going to inflict 
upon human culture.
To understand emergence, the concept of levels of 
abstraction mentioned earlier comes in handy: micro-in-
teractions take place in a lower level of abstraction than 
macro-interactions – micro-interactions regard micro-pol-
itics (tactical, communitarian, local, disruptive, apresen-
tational, bottom-up activities), and macro-interactions 
regard macro-politics (strategic, State-based, legislative, 
elective, stabilizing, representational, top-down activities). 
Micro-politics take place in a low-formality environment, 
absent of statutory codices, through activities that spring 
up from affections and local interaction. Macro-politics 
take place in a high-formality environment, based on leg-
islation (a statutory codex), commonly made operational 
by representative elected leaders. Micro-politics is where 
deep meaning is constructed through meaningful inter-
action; macro-politics is where ideology is produced and 
reproduced via an official narrative. Obviously, micro-pol-
itics and macro-politics are not simply and necessarily 
attached to social scale, but that is a fundamental part of 
their interactive dynamics: any gathering, regardless of its 
social size, can become a State through the adoption of a 
formal statute; but micro-political interactions, based on 
savage thought, can only take place in small groups (see 
the section “Quantity and Quality”).
The question is: how can we operate a consequential 
and meaningful dialogue between these two levels of ab-
straction – between the savage and the instrumental, the 
micro- and the macro-scales, between the deeply mean-
ingful and the overarching ideological?
Procedure
One established definition of the term “relational 
space” is a space that is defined by the relations between 
Figure 3. Micro-interaction, Macro-contexts: interactions 
inside a level of abstraction, interactions between levels 
of abstraction – generally these interactions amass so 
quickly that both our available computational power and 
our personal cognitive reach shy away of understanding 
the macro-consequences in context-weaving.
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the objects that compose it. In that sense, we have several 
possibilities on designing spaces and objects. To topolog-
ically minded metadesigners, “spaces” and “objects” are 
the same – the accepted notion of space as a container, 
and the object as content, is just a matter of perspective: 
a good image is the Russian doll or Matryoshka – each 
doll nests inside other dolls, container and content are 
the same. The practical consequence of that is that what 
you know about one applies to the other, depending on 
the level of abstraction you choose to regard the con-
crete situation: space or object. For instance, all “topology 
typology” that we analyzed for relational spaces applies 
to the configuration of objects. Other instance is that ev-
ery innocent object we see is also a container-space for 
other objects and sub-spaces – meta-spaces containing 
sub-spaces; sub-objects contained by meta-objects. The 
second instance is that if objects are in fact processes – 
stabilized, self-reinforced metabolic cycles – then we must 
understand the procedures, rules, laws or what I call the 
“internal procedural configuration” that enables that pro-
cess to come into being, becoming (devenir).
I consider that the broadest cognitive concept, in this 
matter, is the “magic circle”, proposed by Huizinga (2016 
[1938]) to describe the space in which games, playful cir-
cumstances, rituals, in fact all meaningful situations take 
place. Initially, Huizinga described it as a “space” in the 
sense of a place in the built environment. But the magic 
circle is better understood as a relational space brought 
into being by the actual playing of the game. What defines 
the configuration of the game is the set of rules that de-
fine what can and cannot happen inside the magic circle, 
being them explicit or implicit rules that must be learned 
and taken into account by the players, and put in action by 
the pre-configuration of the material space of the game, 
among other possible rule-limits that constitute the reality 
inside the magic circle. This notion is very elucidating for 
the nature of the built environment: it is a process, not an 
object in the naïve sense, and it is brought into being by 
the articulation of actions directed by procedural limits. So, 
the most basic aspect of reality – the space we inhabit – 
is a process actualized by our own cognitive actions. This 
is very explicit in the way we inhabit the non-euclidean 
space of Earth’s surface.
Spaces (and objects) must be considered topological 
“manifolds”: I take the specific meaning of this term from 
Schroeder (2005), who pedagogically speculates about the 
fictional existence of socio-cultural spaces (“manifolds”) as 
so hermetically sealed from each other that they can share 
the same meta-space and, even so, the inhabitants of each 
manifold still be completely unaware of the inhabitants of 
the other manifold. In this very political view of the nature 
of spatiality, the naïve Euclidean notion of an all-encom-
passing three-dimensional space collapses or is melted 
into a “myriad space” determined not by presumably a 
priori definitions, but by the dynamic interplay of sever-
al sub-spaces, or manifolds, that relationally compose, or 
(re-)lay out, the actual configuration of the meta-space.
It is interesting to mentally visualize the Euclidean 
three-dimensional space being flattened into an irregular 
two-dimensional surface similar to a sphere: the actual liv-
ing space available to humans in our planet – the thicker 
atmospheric space is only available to flying animals that 
can defy the “rule” of gravity. Conversely, it is interesting 
to see how the internal space of a house seems to expand 
in pace with our crowding of it with furniture, personal 
belongings, curtains, etc.: a manifold being unfolded not 
by physically expanding it but by increasing its spatial 
complexity, much like our intestines’ villus: increasing the 
number of entities inside an enclosed space invites our 
perception to recognize a larger set of topological con-
nections – and this is key to convey largeness or smallness 
in spaces.
So reality is brought forth not only from pre-existing 
nature, but especially by articulating procedures that en-
force specific dynamics. These can be the explicit rules of 
a game, the statutory legislation of a nation, organization 
or enterprise, etc. In a broader sense, procedures can be 
computer programs, culinary recipes, chemical or phar-
macist’s formulas, or a design method. In the context of 
metadesign, a procedure is a completely or partially for-
malized sequence of actions that are conducted by peo-
ple, machines or organizations, and that actualize a certain 
mode of reality. In a very formal sense, a procedure is an 
algorithm: a formalized set of actions that use certain in-
puts to produce certain outputs. The metadesigner must 
be able to rise from the position of a player of the game 
(procedure), surpass the operative position of the referee 
or umpire, and invent new games or propose changes in 
the rules that govern and specific game – and occupy the 
position of the “game inventor”. That is the most particular 
metadesign activity: to create new realities or modifica-
tion in existing ones.
Regarding political creation of meaning, metadesign 
can organize creative social games that promote mean-
ingful interactions that can produce significant results, or 
invite the participating community into the “game inven-
tor” activity – in such a way that metadesign becomes the 
utmost democratic activity. But metadesigners must know 
that Virilio’s view on metadesign is an always-present dan-
ger: the concentrated effort to organize new procedures 
can be the utmost tyrannical action.
In the context of urban planning, metadesign can 
bring forward several specific social games that allow 
micro-politics to interact with macro-politics, to apresent 
savage thought in the eyes of instrumental thinking, and 
vice-versa. Such games are becoming common in various 
initiatives such as “Design Thinking”, the “Art of Hosting” 
umbrella concept, “Theory U”, and so many others. But, 
in general, these initiatives lack a theoretical background 
that can provide a rigorous framework for sustained ex-
perimentation, responsible accountability and a broader 
acknowledgement of collaboration’s role in democratic 
action. Because of the haphazard conceptual set up of 
these social games, it is not uncommon for their practi-
tioners to be unable to articulate what I’ve called micro- 
and macro-interactions, to be unaware of the differences 
between savage and instrumental thinking, and their in-
herent potentialities and limitations, and also to incur in 
tyrannical actions, even if unintentionally.
Metadesign can provide a strong conceptual ground-
ing to group work, community organization, and gover-
nance, which would sustain collaborative actions in an 
open but rigorous approach. This is particularly useful in 
the context of the fast spreading of digital technology in 
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daily urban life, which entices the proliferation of new so-
cio-urban habits. The complexity of urban life is increasing 
in such a pace that a “social-political action singularity”2 
may have already surpassed us: digital technology may 
have rendered our traditional cosmo-political views inad-
equate to cope with political action in a meaningful way. 
As a counter-measure, metadesign could expand our abil-
ities to organize complexity, providing an accessible and 
open operational reference for small and large-scale social 
self-organizations outside statutory codices. 
The main action, or social role, of a “metadesigner” is 
to design relational spaces through the laying out of rules, 
laws or procedural limits that entail a consensual reality. 
These relational spaces are the meta-spaces in which a 
significant situation can take place, and they cannot be 
reduced to what architects traditionally consider to be 
the built environment or urban space: the collection of 
material entities that compose buildings and the urban 
infra-structure. These relational- or meta-spaces can com-
prise several different types, they are better described as 
diagrams, all have several and complex abstraction levels, 
and they express emergent behavior that cannot be fore-
seen by its designers/inventors/creators. Of these differ-
ent types of meta-spaces, three are described in this ar-
ticle: Manifolds, Metabolic Cycles, Machines and Meanings 
– these are things that can be mapped, articulated and 
activated through metadesign.
Manifolds, metabolic cycles,  
machines and meanings
In speculative fiction, Schroeder (2005) describes 
Manifolds as technologically and perfectly articulated so-
cial spaces. I propose that actual existing contemporary 
manifolds are imperfectly configured socio-cognitive 
spaces that direct peoples’ attentions and, conversely, are 
directed/configured by peoples’ actions: socio-political 
constructs that, much like Huizinga’s situations or games, 
emerge from coherently and mutually integrated actions 
of the game participants. From the person’s point-of-refer-
ence, the manifold he or she inhabits is the only viable re-
ality available – the more attached a person is to that man-
ifold, more rigid, exclusive and all-encompassing it will 
seem to be, more like a “world”. In anthropological terms, a 
manifold is more and less than a “worldview” or a “cosmol-
ogy”, despite being very similar to them: it is more spatial, 
by limiting and directing embodied action/perception; 
and it’s less verbal or symbolic, not being necessarily de-
fined by a founding narrative. It directs one’s perception of 
what can be done in the perceived world in spatial terms, 
and it affects one’s embodiment, how his or her body can 
displace and enforce itself. A manifold is constituted by 
several kinds of coherent habits: language habits, tech-
nology habits, perceptual habits, political habits, bodily 
habits – it is something like the habitus, the aggregate of 
recurrent and recursive actions that are embodied in daily 
actions. The built environment is a part of this aggregate 
and by far not the fundamental part of it – this is expressed 
by the increasing amount of modifications we are impos-
ing to buildings and the city in recent times, brought by 
the increasing pace in which we are changing our mani-
folds, our habitus. To understand manifolds, we must de-
scribe them through “maps” that are not limited to what 
we can see in cartographical maps of territorial geography, 
but must also demonstrate connections between different 
regions an aspects of the relational space we inhabit: isn’t 
this the concrete city we live in? Debord has tried to map 
the city of Paris that he had in mind, as an inhabitant: his 
“Naked City” (1957) is an affective urban map, and not like 
the Paris we see in a topographical map. But the mapping 
of a manifold must also contain linguistic practices, image-
rial patterns, movement mapping. Maybe something like 
Eric Fischer’s emergent maps of the world, making visible 
complex telecommunication versus territorial habits.
Metabolic Cycles are a fundamental aspect of biology. 
We can consider them to be a relevant part of the term 
“reality”, considering it as the diagrammatic and/or sym-
bolic, and therefore incomplete, mapping of the ecosys-
tem: a living object understood as a “stabilized and endur-
ing metabolic cycle”. This incurs in accepting that “objects” 
can be something very different from “massed blocks of 
matter”: they can be “diaphanous fluxes”. Some are al-
ready recognized, such as the water cycle (involving per-
spiration, evaporation, condensation, and precipitation), 
in the macro-world of the entire planet, and the Krebs cy-
cle (involving the metabolism of chemical energy), in the 
micro-world inside living cells in every organism. If we’re 
going to consider metabolic cycles as objectual entities, 
our understanding of objectual reality must be adjusted 
to put the idea of universal entities “in parenthesis” – and 
we must recognize individual objects (be them com-
posed by “massed matter” or “diaphanous fluxes”) in their 
inalienable singularity. Deleuze would say that, on tradi-
tional epistemics, to affirm an entity’s typological identity 
is to affirm its validity, but that would not make it recog-
nizable in its singularity, and only would subjugate it to 
universal types (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995 [1987]). Hardt 
and Negri suggest that we must substitute or overcome 
the idea of identity by that of singularity, recognizing en-
tities not by which category they subscribe to (identity) 
but by intrinsic self-organizing and internal structures 
(singularity). That applies to the broader ecosystem we in-
habit, but also to our communities and ourselves: as per-
sons participating in communities, we should not need 
to be classified in terms of universal types, but should be 
able to express our singularities.
To describe an entity as a metabolic cycle is to affirm 
its singularity and that of its context. A social institution is 
a metabolic cycle stabilized by its regulations that deter-
mine, to enough extent, the material fluxes that comprise 
it. The issue in this matter is transformation: to understand 
metadesign as the design of metamorphosis, of things 
that change over time, and to be able to deal with the con-
sequences of the unstoppable passage of time.
2 In this specific passage, I mention the word “Singularity” according to the currently notorious meaning of the “technological singularity” theory, 
which states that soon we won’t be able to understand, much less cope with, the consequences of advanced computer technology (Vinge, 1993; 
Kurzweil, 2006). In all other parts of this paper, the term “singularity” means the singular aspects or qualities of an entity, which is different from its 
“identity”, i.e. the aspects that would make it a representation of an abstract and presumably universal category.
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Furthermore, thinking in terms of metabolic cycles 
takes into account that our natural environment is finite: 
in our planetary ecosystem, metabolic cycles can only 
transform the same amount of matter into different con-
figurations.
Machines can be seen not as mere mechanical enti-
ties, but as abstract constructs that direct action through 
the integrated movement of myriad objects in their do-
main. Deleuze and Guattari (1995 [1987]) suggested that 
the whole of the human ecosystem could be considered 
a “mechanosphere”, meaning that all socio-cultural activi-
ties take place in a complex and approximately stable con-
figuration of material, cultural and technical fluxes. I have 
suggested that what we call an artist’s “style” is an “abstract 
machine”: the way an artist works is his or hers major cre-
ative object, comprising methods, recurrent schemes, 
specific material and objectual selections that have been 
organized into a stance towards creative work that results 
in the production of specific kinds of objects. We can see 
the organization of creative social games as the set up of 
a social machine that can entail concrete action in the city.
The configuration of these machines is also the work 
of the metadesigner, trying to configure social action not 
through direct command and control but by organizing 
certain interactive modes – by interfering in micro-mac-
ro interactions. Varkki George (2006 [1997]) has specu-
lated, even if dubiously, that urban design is the action 
of metadesigning the city: the creation of “decision en-
vironments”, on which society codifies the generally de-
sired characteristics of a city, and afterwards that same 
society uses that “abstract machine” to direct the actual 
construction of the urban environment. If that sounds 
strange, we can rename those components and see that 
it’s the recurrent way we have been doing urban planning 
all along: the “decision environment” comprise the set of 
urban regulations, zoning and occupation standards, 
building codes and usage legislation that’s obligatorily 
taken into account in the design process of any actual ur-
ban development program, building or street furniture. 
And it is obvious that the construction of that “decision 
environment” can only be a heated political debate, gen-
erally done in a haphazard manner, and conducted by a 
closed and minimal social interaction repertoire – recur-
rently based on assemblies, consensus building, motions 
and elections: few people speak and many listen. People 
are increasingly open to a new set of social games that 
can change definitively what we call “urban planning” or 
“urban design” – based on open conversational configu-
rations, such as the already popular “world café”, an many 
other open collective practices, on which many people 
listen, but the same amount of people speak. There are 
many emergent “creative social machines”, even if hap-
hazardly conceived and operated. Metadesign can help 
map these machines, indicating specific and opportune 
points of action, inflection and interference.
A final aspect of reality building is that of Meaning: 
reality as valued perception – shared social values, memes, 
inventions, and images – the subjectively summarized in-
tentionality. If we understand reality as a “useful fiction”, 
constructed based upon meaning brought by perception, 
then aesthetics and meaning are the basic building blocks 
of reality: from a metadesign perspective, we should con-
centrate on articulating meaningful situations in which 
meaningful interactions would take place. And meaning-
ful social interaction is mostly comprised by what happens 
in small communities and local connections in the rela-
tional space – what pertains to “savage thinking”.
Savage thought, Instrumental thought
The long-standing belief that savagery is a primi-
tive, and somehow incomplete, socio-cultural stance has 
been debunked by a series of twentieth-century anthro-
pologists and philosophers: starting with the positing of 
“savage thought”, by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1989 [1962]), 
then “savage politics”, by Pierre Clastres (2003), and the 
conflicting dialogue between the civilized and the nomad 
(savage), by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987 [1980]) 
– to summarize their line of inquiry, the savage, or nomad, 
is not a more primitive state through which mankind has 
passed in its initial developmental phases, but is a quality 
of being, or becoming, that is alive in mankind right now. 
All sorts of preconceived views about savage societies 
abound regarding them as “lacking” civilized traits (such as 
government, the State, the market, currency, etc.) – Clas-
tres and others have argued against such views, charac-
terizing savage thought as a fundamental mode of being/
becoming and making politics; besides that, the identifi-
cation of savagery with the “primitive”, “primeval”, “incom-
petent”, “brutal”, and specially “violent”, are all referents 
deriving from the (dubious) notion that civilized societies 
have “surpassed” this initial developmental stage through 
discipline, the necessary self-control and learning funda-
mental to the advancement of culture.
Savage thinking is characterized not by its end or us-
age, but by itself: the savage thinks in an untamed man-
ner, for the sake of thinking, and it is embodied in life, not 
something theoretical in the sense of referring to an exter-
nal plane of being. Civilized thinking, on the other hand, is 
characterized by the need to apply it to some end – it is a 
tamed, a “put-to-use” thought, justified by its usage or ap-
plication: its motivation is always something external and/
or transcendental – actualizing a presumed inescapable 
duality between the body and the soul. We could com-
prehend savage thought as an “embodied” or immanent 
mode of thinking and acting, and the civilized thought 
as a dualistic, transcendental mode of thinking divorced 
from action. But we prefer to refer to them as “savage” and 
“instrumental”: savage thought is the inescapable feel-
ing of belonging to the living moment, where and when 
meaning is phenomenologically perceived/created – it is 
the mode of thinking/acting that is characteristic of com-
munal life, sustained by informal, or para-formal, quasi-for-
mal communication; instrumental thought is the finalistic 
approach to life, working through dualities (theory/prac-
tice, mind/body, individual/environment, etc.), which re-
quires ever more formal modes of communication, com-
mand and control – it is the mode of “thinking to conform 
action” characteristic of Statutory life, where meaning al-
ways seems to be elusive and outside the social-political 
complex of technology. Horkheimer and Adorno (1969) 
have identified “instrumental reason” as a problem to be 
overcome by critical reasoning. Morin (2005 [1990]) has 
denounced the “blindness” of the scientific establishment, 
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trying to reduce the inherently irreducible complexity of 
the world to “keys of knowledge”, conceptual “black box-
es”, never to be questioned (opened, re-analyzed) again. 
So, in principle, according to these thinkers, instrumental 
or anti-complex thought should be abandoned in favor of 
another approach. My findings indicate that the most con-
sequential approach should be to embrace the limits of 
instrumental reason, at the same time we maintain these 
limits inside our perceptual field: if we see “instruments of 
knowledge” not as all-encompassing, but as fallible, re-
placeable, and precarious devices, than we are no longer 
captives of universal or instrumental thought, we are free 
to utilize instrumental concepts as part of an incomplete 
set of “tools”, as would say Deleuze and Guattari (1995 
[1987]). In this way, we also avoid some kind of “complexi-
ty purism”, an extreme of rigor that is, in fact, just another 
manifestation of transcendental thinking.
Regarding violence, it is something that is always pres-
ent, being the spasmodic or ritual violence of the savage, 
or the controlled, hierarchical/abstract violence of the social 
contract fundamental to civilized societies (Lévy, 1998).
Even inside civilized societies communities construct 
meaning through constant communication embodied in 
savage thought: through gossip and the embodied com-
municated presence of one another. It is in this milieu that 
we construct/perceive what we consider to be more fun-
damentally “real”. Even when we learn, through our par-
ents, school teachers and friends, that we must conform 
to civilized authority, learn the aspects of large collectives 
productive capacities, and so forth, that appreciation is 
presented to us by means of embodiment, and not so 
much through abstract learning of formal principles.
On the other hand, instrumental thinking works 
through the formal construction of codified communica-
tion in the State constitution and laws, in organizations’ 
formal rules and obligations – Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
in “Thousand plateaus” invites us to regard any type of or-
ganization constituted by means of statutory regulation as 
a “State”, regardless of its social size and/or national status. 
It was by means of the usage of, and submission to, formal 
and power-conveying communication that mankind has 
been able to aggregate such large societies as in modern 
Nation-States, and to direct their movements towards 
productive activities, especially in industrial societies and 
large-scale enterprises.
Probably, it has now become clear that the savage 
and the civilized are not mutually exclusive modes of 
social interaction, but are, in civilized societies, two very 
distinct levels of existence or becoming (devenir), most 
of the time operating in two types of situations that only 
imperfectly communicate with each other. The concept of 
“nomad science” versus “royal science” is very elucidating: 
singular, and therefore concrete, meanings are produced 
in the context of communities thinking savagely (nomad 
science); only afterwards can these meanings be captured, 
disciplined, reduced and bureaucratized into freely mobile 
documentation (royal science). In a sense, metadesigners 
should be able to “hack” royal science, and introduce deep 
meaning in implicit ways into creative social games that 
integrate savage and instrumental thought.
Quantity and quality
If changes in scale necessarily incur in changes in char-
acter, there is interference between two categories that 
traditionally are mutually exclusive, quantity and quality. 
But in fact, regarding micro-macro relations, as complexity 
amasses, it creates emergent traits that are completely in-
existent in lower levels of abstraction – the State emerging 
from the community, for instance. But these levels of ab-
straction have specific thresholds that can sometimes be 
detected, affected and dealt with: we can not only identify 
what can happen inside each level, but we can also look 
for actions that can only be inflicted onto specific levels. 
One such level is that of “communities”. The community has 
been an eluding concept for quite long, but Dunbar (1995) 
has established a correlation between human cognitive 
limits and the size of communities regarding reciprocal re-
lations between individuals: social aggregates below 150 
individuals, approximately (the so called “Dunbar’s num-
ber”), display mutual support and fast influence between 
people. Is that a “community”, where savage thought is 
prevailing? Above that number of people, a different kind 
of social dynamics must be put into place to stabilize a so-
cial aggregate, mostly based on formal communication. 
Larger social constructs, like the clan, nations, modern 
nation-states, and the globalized society of today are all 
based on more or less formal narratives accounting for 
the organizing cosmology of that society, which damp – 
but do not wipe out – the whirling dynamics of savagery; 
they will still survive in micro-scale communication. Here 
we find an association between levels of abstraction and 
levels of formalization: in communities, we are in a low lev-
el of abstraction (relatively few people), and we exercise 
communication at very low level of formalization – being 
gossip a good example; in large scale societies, we are at 
a high level of abstraction (people in large numbers), and 
we need to mediate social interaction with highly formal-
ized communication – the founding social contract is a 
good example. In between those two levels of abstraction 
and formalization, we have lots of different scales, some 
displaying well-defined thresholds, some not.
Each level of abstraction (and formalization, since 
both are correlated in socio-cultural complexity) can 
produce a different kind of manifold, which can produce 
different kinds of cultural products – e.g. meanings, ideas, 
patents, ideology, narratives – but the research relating 
each of these through the different levels is still incom-
plete.3 But regarding the extremes – elaborated by the 
duality community/savage versus State/instrumental 
thought –, we can indicate a complementary cosmology, 
articulating a new epistemic outlook that is bounded by 
our own contemporary cognitive limits.
Engagement with the savage mind is best be made 
through tangible actions, best presented by meaningful 
conversations mediated by informal notes, visually and 
3 The relation between manifold modes and social scale presented here is derived from observations done on field and consultancy work; therefore 
it is very speculative and somewhat anecdotal. The actual research work to correlate these two aspects is a task to be developed by numerous pro-
ductions, planned for the future research.
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collectively made diagrams, graphic and visual constructs 
(recurrently called “tools”), organized in specific manifolds 
and machines to maximize results. I interpret the contem-
porary “post-it mania” as the expression of a desperate, yet 
previously unheeded, need to collectively and dynamical-
ly arrange ideas in a diagrammatic form. Engagement with 
the instrumental mind is of course the bread and butter of 
institutional communication work, but it is being reconfig-
ured to accommodate this new reality.
There is a growing repertoire of manifolds and social 
machines: the diagrammatic arrangements of people in 
the scale of communities to address the aspects of engage-
ment, productive work, accountability and responsible ac-
tion. In fact, I interpret this expanding and complexifying 
array of methods, games and procedures being heuristical-
ly developed as the expression of a not so clearly explicit 
intent to enable the community-scale, the savage mind, to 
speak more clearly and be better understood by the State-
scale, the instrumental mind. Therefore, the opportunity 
brought by metadesign is to better articulate this grow-
ing repertoire, and not to rethink it, through a “clean-slate” 
methodology, that would set things right by the presum-
ably correct application of scientific and philosophical work. 
On the contrary: to metadesign is to incorporate what’s 
been heuristically and communally produced as ad hoc 
methods into a complex set of loosely, but rigorously, artic-
ulated tools. The issue, in metadesign work, is not of attain-
ing formalized methods and or results, but of constructing 
viable and meaningful creative situations.
Co-creation games
Recently, there has been an upsurge in interest in 
community-driven innovation4: organizing communities 
in temporary initiatives to generate meaningful answers 
to clearly defined issues regarding those same commu-
nities. This self-observation and self-reconfiguration is an 
exemplary metadesign activity: an entity restructuring it-
self. Most of the time, practitioners and group coordinators 
that lead these projects aren’t aware of this metadesigning 
quality of their actions – but they still end up using cog-
nitive tools that are variations inside the four that I have 
mentioned earlier (diagram, abstraction, emergence, pro-
cedure). Even if we consider that innovation is a process 
substantiated not by public polls – and its myriad variations 
(such as the notorious “focus group”) – but by the distrib-
uted exercise of creativity, it still needs to be grounded in 
the social context. This grounding cannot be in statistically 
constructed demands voiced by potential future users – 
since they cannot voice a need they cannot feel. So, in most 
cases, the self-entitled innovative organization develops an 
exercise of “social ventriloquism”, projecting its own find-
ings and proposals as “the voice of the target audience”. But 
there is room for co-creation games that would honestly 
articulate the poietic process in a socially distributed way.
Innovation and art
Recently, the mistaken idea that innovation is some-
thing that can be ordered in a commoditized way has 
put enormous pressure on creative teams that are part 
of corporations, organizations and communities. To ease 
that pressure, lots of consultancies, advisors and theoret-
ical material have come forward, trying to frame the per-
ceived “obligation to innovate” in a productive approach. 
A recurrent aspect of these initiatives is to locate a clearly 
defined need, preferably originated in a specific communi-
ty, interpret it as a “problem” (or “pain”), and consequently 
Figure 4. Aspects or qualities of the dialogue between “savage” and “instrumental” thinking. These aspects are not part of 
a table, but more of a constellation of concepts, reflected in one another: each aspect in the lower half of the diagram has 
a counterpart in the upper half. The lower half presents the aspects of the savage or nomad world, while the upper half 
refers to the civilized or sedentary world. Both co-exist today, but savage thinking is the inescapable substrate that entices 
reality to exist, while instrumental thinking can only exist supported by each counterpart in the lower, savage, half. A way 
to visualize this diagram is seeing each segment, lower or upper, as a mirror-image of its counterpart, like in folded piece 
of paper, the fold being the segmented middle-line: each aspect or quality would meet with its counterpart. Note: there 
are more aspects in this diagram than were discussed in the present paper.
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4 Some examples are the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (https://eit.europa.eu/tags/communities-driven-innovation), Yunus So-
cial Business Global Initiatives (http://www.yunussb.com/), and so many consultancies specialized in promoting productive social gatherings.
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derive from it a “solution”: the much desired “innovation”. 
This is a very naïve understanding of the innovation pro-
cess for three reasons: (1) it puts the innovation process 
in a bounded context, excluding a much broader social 
ecosystem that has a more sophisticated spatio-tempo-
ral dynamic than can be found in “innovation sprints”; 
(2) consequently, approaches that supposedly drive in-
novation end up excluding an ample array of pre-formal, 
non-formal, para-formal and informal concepts (typical of 
the high-meaning, low-formality of the savage mind) that 
would allow to consider entities that do not fit in estab-
lished taxonomies – symptomatically, the biggest difficul-
ty in the aforementioned approaches is the recurrent even-
tual refusal of ideas that enter in conflict with the accepted 
identity of the innovation process’s sponsor company or 
organization – that conflict being what’s exactly expected 
from the actual innovation; (3) the idea that innovation is 
an “answer to a need” is the expression of modern societ-
ies’ characteristic schizophrenic worldview (Bateson, 2000; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1995 [1987]): the saying “necessity 
is the mother of invention” is an oxymoron, since, as is 
known in evolutionary biology – through the exclusion of 
Lamarckism –, an innovation can’t be needed before it ex-
ists. An innovation is the result of a perceived opportunity, 
not of a problem or already articulated necessity.
One possible explanation of Art is the “ontological 
mobilization of reality”:5 it creates entities that, having 
no place in the established taxonomy and ontology (the 
philosophical “monster”), force us to change our notion of 
“what is real”. This aspect has long been identified as the 
“educational” function of art and poetics, and has been 
deeply reinforced since the advent of what I call the “Ro-
manticist-Positivistic Fracture”: the modern invention of 
the sciences (by Positivism) and the promotion of the cur-
rently accepted notion of art (by Romanticism) – art and 
science became mutually exclusive concepts, despite sev-
eral attempts on the opposite direction during the last two 
centuries. To overcome that Fracture, we’d need to re-in-
clude in Art’s conceptual framework previously accepted 
and, in fact, inseparable aspects of poetics, such as what’s 
called “technology” (according to positivistic epistemics), 
that’s been divorced from art with a political agenda after 
a long pre-modern struggle between servile and liberal 
arts. But if we do overcome that Fracture, those two legis-
latively divorced aspects of socio-cultural life would again 
mingle: science would need to accept its own monstros-
ities (i.e. non-classifiable entities) and art would be back 
as a broader field, with direct practical consequences to 
social life. In that hypothetical socio-cultural context, there 
would be no difference between art and innovation: both 
are the disruptive introduction of “monsters” and “chime-
ras” in the urban-political ecosystem – both innovation 
and art change the configuration of relational spaces of 
culture and society, and irrevocably change the balance of 
political power in micro- and macro-contexts.
Paradoxically, this broader and more complex under-
standing of innovation is more powerful in its socio-political 
consequences, but is lighter and more playful in its organiza-
tional aspects: if we posit that innovation operates the same 
way as art, then we also need to change the way we organize 
and direct “innovation cycles” in organizations, enterprises 
and communities. In summary: innovative action needs to 
resemble more art practice. And art works by exploring and 
developing opportunities not by solving problems.
These opportunities can be laid-out by creative ac-
tions in many ways. But I have found that the incomplete 
but sufficient mapping of the relations between the exist-
ing socio-techno-political ecosystem and the changes put 
forward by the proposed innovation can be articulated in 
four fronts: (a) technology and methods – how does the 
innovation work? Being that in terms of material technol-
ogy (semi-conductors, electricity, internal combustion, 
for instance), or procedural-organizational technology 
(methods, just-in-time production and distribution, digital 
fabrication, software and applications, for instance); (b) an-
thropology and the socio-cultural context – what are the 
images that populate people’s minds regarding that aspect 
of their lives? That being aspirations, habits, manifolds, 
shared social-spaces, etc.; (c) financial and revenue models 
– how would the innovation sustain itself in the economy? 
Being that an aspect of direct/indirect payments, or the 
creation of perceived value; (d) aesthetics and ergonomics 
– how do people perceive and relate to the innovation? It 
can be a rigorous poetic-aesthetic consideration, or an em-
bodied relation, materialized through ergonomics. These 
aspects are approximately enough to describe both the in-
novation and the ecosystem it will affect – and their map-
ping is also an application of metadesign’s cognitive tools.
Metadesign and the distributed city
Metadesign can help reorganize this array of meth-
ods and cognitive tools that are dedicated to innovation 
– with special interest for the invention of new forms the 
urban context–, composing or adjusting manifolds, meta-
bolic cycles and machines, and help create new meaning 
and contribute directly to a new urban-political dynamics.
A “city of fluxes” (Arantes and Braga, 2007) can only 
be expressed from a different epistemic than that inher-
ited from the “Romanticist-Positivistic Fracture”; an urban 
community that is proficient in articulating apresentations 
and not only representations; an urban environment com-
posed of singularities that are not required to conform to 
identities; a city that embraces the micro-scale of the com-
munity while still being operational in the macro-scale of 
statutory rule. A meta-city composed of manifolds: urban 
living spaces that cannot be simply reduced to territori-
al neighborhoods, buildings, or infrastructure, and have 
their overlapped socio-political aspects mapped out to 
public overview.
The “Distributed City” (Vassão, 2014) is a non-section-
able world-urban environment: a city that has no centralities 
(a distributed system) also does not conform to geographi-
cal subdivisions determined by territorial nation-states, and, 
through ubiquitous telecommunication, brings forth social 
spaces that extend into different regions, continents and 
geographies: the Distributed City is changing the nature, 
extension and dynamics of manifolds, making them world-
5 This paragraph is a summarized exposition of the argument I present in another paper, interpreting innovation as a variation of the poetic or artistic 
process (Vassão, 2016).
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wide entities. Thanks to today’s fast and cheap telecom and 
transportation, people live in similar ways in very distant 
parts of the globe, entailing new micro-politics that clash 
with territorial localities: very dissimilar life styles are sharing 
increasingly close territorial companionship.
The complexity of such world-urbanity is of vast pro-
portions, and traditional urbanism is poorly prepared to 
deal with this context. Metadesign can contribute to new 
urbanistic methods that do not subscribe themselves to 
Positivism, and therefore put universals into parenthesis, 
are based in concrete singularities that can only be elabo-
rated through social co-creation games: the current urban 
communities’ socio-cultural complexity makes it increas-
ingly clear that there can be no a priori universals taken 
as immovable, immutable and invariant objects. These will 
be dynamic urban methods that surpass the prevailing 
epistemics by making it possible for the urban environ-
ment to become mobile, flexible and changing; not only in 
terms of mobile entities but also in terms of mobile con-
cepts – being them ideas about the city and their citizens, 
but also legislative concepts and objects.
The material presented in this paper is a short sum-
mary of the research I have been conducting. But a sub-
stantial amount of work is required to derive these find-
ings into concrete social machines that can promote the 
democratic development of the future city. Rigorously, 
this will be the facilitation of the urban environment’s 
self-organization: a metadesigning activity – the unfold-
ing of the here presented set of tools into concrete action 
through the organization of social co-creation games. The 
Distributed City creating itself.
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